

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL		X		
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO				
20	C/ACIS		X		
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SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

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Date

Executive Registry

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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C. 20515**

January 23, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

As a new Congress convenes and as you begin your second term as President, we laud your efforts in rebuilding America's defenses. Due to your leadership, relations with our allies are stronger than ever and our adversaries once again respect the U.S.

Your efforts in making Congress and the American people aware of Soviet intentions and capabilities helped reverse our military decline. The two reports you released last year detailing 21 specific Soviet arms control treaty violations were enlightening and helpful.

As helpful as these two reports were, we nevertheless believe that there may be at least 43 further Soviet violations. Attached is a list of the suspected additional violations. These suspected violations, which have yet to be confirmed by your Administration, should be reviewed and ought to be discussed in your report to Congress announced as forthcoming on February 1 if the meaning and spirit of current law is to be fulfilled.

Some have tried in the past to cover-up Soviet treaty violations because they feared that reporting them would undermine negotiations or they just didn't know what to do about them. But this type of non-action only encouraged further misconduct and eroded confidence in the worth of any agreement with the Soviets.

But now the cover-up is ending because of your realistic approach towards Soviet treaty violations. We believe that your straightforward reports and discussion of these matters with the Soviets will greatly strengthen the public's confidence in arms control negotiations.




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Mr President, we look forward to the prompt release of your February 1 report to Congress, with its review of the additional 43 Soviet suspected violations. It will certainly advance the cause of a more secure America and lead to greater confidence in real reductions of nuclear arms through negotiations.

Sincerely,



encl:

cc: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, CIA ✓  
Director, ACDA  
National Security Advisor to the President

Encl: Unclassified List of 43 Unreported and Unconfirmed Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations, in Order of Military Significance

The U.S. Unilateral Disarmament under SALT II

1. Soviet failure to deactivate over 500 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, in order to come down to the SALT II level of 2,250. The Carter Administration claimed this deactivation to be the principal U.S. military benefit from SALT II. This is the most obvious and the most militarily significant Soviet SALT II violation, yet it has never been reported to Congress in two successive Presidential violations reports. Even the London Economist has pointed this out as a clear-cut Soviet SALT II violation. The only way to explain this glaring omission is to postulate that your Administration has reached some secret agreement with the Soviets exempting them from this deactivation. If this is the case, the Senate should have been informed. Such an agreement would be contrary to the Constitution, Section 33 of the Arms Control Act, the Case Act, and the Jackson Amendment requirement for equal levels of forces. At the very least, this Soviet violation negates your Administration's "interim restraint" policy of "not undercutting" and in fact complying precisely with the unratified SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviets show "equal restraint." This Soviet failure to deactivate shows no restraint at all, because while the U.S. has unilaterally deactivated 292 strategic delivery vehicles, counted in SALT II, carrying over 500 warheads, the Soviets have in fact been adding Backfire and Bear H bombers with long range ALCMs, SS-16 mobile ICBMs, and now mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs, Typhoons, SS-N-18s, SS-N-23s, and even supersonic and other cruise missiles to their forces. Thus the U.S. is engaged in unilateral disarmament in the face of Soviet SALT II break-out.

George Will in The Washington Post of December 30, 1984 precisely described the State Department's appeasement of the Soviets while the U.S. unilaterally complies with SALT II. Will wrote:

Although the SALT II agreement, signed in 1979, will never be ratified, both sides have agreed not to 'undercut' it, including its provision limiting both sides to 2,250 long-range bombers and missiles. The Soviets have never adhered to that limit and in recent weeks have passed 2,500. But a U.S. official eager for continued U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II, has come forth to say: 'We are not sure that the "no-undercut" provision (sic) is violated if the Soviets do not keep the 2,250 limit on missiles and bombers. It means not complying, but does it mean undercutting?' The Soviet Union has a lot of people whose job is to violate agreements, and a lot of people whose job is to try to hide violations, and a third lot whose job is to try to explain away violations that are detected. Do we really need to employ, in the State Department, a lot of people to help with the rationalization by distinguishing the act of 'undercutting' agreements from the act of 'not complying with' agreements?

On June 24, 1982, a top State Department official was asked what the difference was between the Soviets abiding by SALT II or adhering

to it. He answered: "...if one were to adhere to the treaty we would be requiring the Soviets to now have reduced and continuing to reduce, and we're not requiring that. So we're not requiring that they adhere to the treaty...They say they are not bound to it." The Soviets are not adhering to or abiding by SALT II, hence they are undercutting it.

#### The Kennedy-Khrushchev Violations

2. Soviet violations of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement by deployment of offensive nuclear delivery capable weapons in Cuba with twice the capability of the missiles and bombers there in 1962. This Soviet violation done in the early 1970s was partially reported in the GAC Report, but there is further evidence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, this Soviet arms control violation is so important that it should be explicitly and fully treated. Finally, you yourself have publicly accused the Soviets of violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement twice, and you have been backed up by the UnderSecretary of Defense, the CIA Director, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even the State Department concedes that on several occasions, the Soviets have violated the "spirit" of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement. If the Soviets are violating the agreement that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, does this mean the U.S. is back into a nuclear crisis with the Soviets?

#### The Soviet Violation of All SALT II Ceilings

3. Soviet announced intention to violate the 820, 1200, and 1320 SALT II ceilings on MIRVs and long-range ALCMs, and Soviet programmatic preparations to do so before SALT II expires at the end of 1985. These preparations include impending deployment of the MIRVed SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs in both silo and mobile modes, continued production of Delta III and Typhoon submarines, and production of Backfire and TU-95 Bear H intercontinental bombers with long-range ALCMs. And all Bears should count in the 1320 ceiling, because they can carry the long-range AS-3 Kangaroo. Meanwhile, the U.S. plans to scrap 4 perfectly operational Poseidon submarines in order to comply unilaterally with the SALT II 1200 MIRV ceiling. Again, this is U.S. unilateral disarmament.

Thus the Soviets are violating all the MIRV/ALCM ceilings, in addition to violating the ceiling of 2,250 on total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets are also violating the Article IV SALT II constraint on developing no more than one new type ICBM, the key constraint of SALT II. In sum, the Soviets have succeeded in converting the SALT II Treaty into a hollow shell, with virtually no constraints on them, while the U.S. has committed itself to precise unilateral compliance with an unratified treaty. The Soviets have added over 200 intercontinental bomber and 200 ICBMs to their forces since 1979, when SALT II was signed, according to official Defense Department data.

#### Soviet Transcendence of MX

4. Deploying 14 warheads on each SS-18, when SALT II allows only 10. This has allowed the Soviets to add over 2,200 warheads alone to their ICBM force during the year of 1984 alone, which is over 3 times the number of warheads the MX will add to the U.S. ICBM force between 1987 and 1990, if MX is ever deployed. This has resulted in a Soviet ICBM force carrying over 8,500 warheads, a 4 to 1 numerical advantage over the U.S., and a 6 to 1 advantage considering Soviet accuracy and megatonnage advantages. Meanwhile, the U.S. has

reduced the MX payload from 14 warheads to 10, and has reduced MX throw-weight, in order to comply with SALT II. And the U.S. is gratuitously and unilaterally deactivating 54 Titan II ICBMs, one-third of our ICBM megatonnage. Moreover, the MX program has been cut in half since the Carter Administration.

5. Soviet developing, testing, and exercising the SS-18 ICBM rapid reload and refire capability, to include stockpiling extra missiles and ground support equipment near launch sites, in violation of SALT II's prohibition on ICBM rapid reload capability. Indeed, the Soviets have even given their hot-launched SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs a refire capability, in addition to their cold-launched SS-17.

#### Soviet ABM Break-Out

6. Soviet developing, testing and deploying an ABM rapid reload and refire capability, prohibited by the SALT I ABM Treaty.

7. Soviet preparations for deployment of a nationwide ABM defense, involving ABM Battle Management Radars, plus ABM-mode mobile SAM interceptors and ABM-3 mobile radars, in violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

8. Soviet preparations for a second ABM complex defending ICBMs with SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 ABM interceptors, in the Krasnoyarsk region, in violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. The Soviets are already circumventing the SALT I ABM Treaty by giving the modernized Moscow ABM system the capability to defend ICBMs.

9. Soviet testing of surface-to-air missiles in a prohibited ABM mode--SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12. Former Defense Secretary Laird charges this is a violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty, and former Secretary of State Kissinger has also conceded that this was a "violation." This should be explicitly reported on, because it was regarded only as a "possible" violation in the GAC Report. But a Soviet defense expert has even admitted that the Soviets have tested SAMs in a prohibited ABM-mode.

#### Soviets Increase the Risk of Nuclear War

10. Soviet violation of the 1971 Agreement to Prevent the Risk of Nuclear War, by jamming U.S. early warning detection systems and failing to notify the U.S. of this jamming. As the 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power states on page 35: "The Soviets also have the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare against space systems." They are doing this. These are acts of electronic warfare in space, and at the very least should inhibit progress in further arms control negotiations until the jamming stops.

#### Soviets Deploy Heavy SS-19 ICBM

11. Soviet circumvention of the object and purpose of the SALT I Interim Agreement by their deployment of their heavy SS-19 ICBM, to replace their light SS-11 ICBMs. This helped to give the Soviets a 6 to 1 counterforce first strike superiority. Although this violation was confirmed already in the GAC Report, it is of

paramount military significance because it sextupled the warheads in the 360 converted single-warhead SS-11 silos. It therefore should be explicitly treated by the Administration. Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird first charged Soviet SS-19 deployment as a SALT I violation in 1975. Henry Kissinger called it "sharp practice" in 1979.

12. Concealment of the existence and heavy throw-weight of the SS-19 heavy ICBM, during SALT I negotiations, and repeated denial of their intention to deploy such a missile to replace their light SS-11 ICBM. This is a related issue of Soviet negotiating deception on the most important issue of SALT I; heavy ICBM constraints. Again, Kissinger called the SS-19 deception "sharp practice."

### Soviet Backfire Bomber Violations

13. As UnderSecretary of Defense DeLauer has testified, production of 35 Backfire bombers per year for several years, in violation of Brezhnev's SALT II commitment not to produce more than 30 per year. The late Soviet Premier Kosygin on August 20, 1979, told U.S. Senators that this would be a violation, and that the U.S. could abrogate SALT II if the Soviets did this.

14. Arctic staging of the Backfire bomber, in violation of Brezhnev's pledge that as an integral part of SALT II, the Soviets would not give the Backfire an intercontinental radius capability.

15. Giving Backfire a refueling capability, in violation of Brezhnev's SALT II pledge not to give Backfire a refueling capability. All of these Backfire constraints were an integral part of SALT II, according to the Carter Administration.

16. Equipping Backfire with long-range ALCMs, causing it to count in the SALT II 1320 MIRV/ALCM ceiling and putting the USSR over this ceiling.

17. Deceiving the U.S. on the Backfire's inherent range of 8,900 to 11,000 kilometers, which is much more than the 8,000 kilometer range of the obsolete Bison bomber which did count in SALT II.

### Soviet Heavy SLBMs

18. Testing and preparation to deploy the SS-NX-23, a heavy SLBM, in violation of SALT II's prohibition on heavy SLBMs. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this is a Soviet SALT II violation.

### Soviet Stockpiled ICBMs

19. Producing and deploying old stockpiled SS-11 ICBMs at MRBM and IRBM soft sites for covert soft launch, in circumvention of SALT I and SALT II ceilings. This was one of the GAC Report's "suspicious events," and it is an important Soviet violation.

20. Maintaining several thousand Soviet stockpiled ICBMs, SLBMs, and SLCMs, and thus circumventing all SALT II ceilings. The Soviets have made preparations not only to rapidly reload ICBM silos, but also to rapidly reload SLBM and SLCM submarines after firing their missiles at sea.

#### Soviet Submarine Violations

21. Constructing "Stretch Y-Class" submarines with illegal missile bay sections, which are even longer than the original ballistic missile bay sections, and which have illegal missile tubes penetrating the pressure hull for a prohibited type of long-range supersonic SLCM launchers. This is a very dangerous Soviet violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the 1974 agreed SALT dismantling procedures, because it could greatly increase the surprise attack threat to U.S. bomber forces.

22. Construction of over 68 strategic submarines, when the SALT I Interim Agreement allowed only 62. Moreover, maintaining over 981 SLBMs, when SALT I allowed only 950.

#### Soviet Reuse of Deactivated ICBM Complexes

23. Bringing back ICBMs to deactivated ICBM complexes, such as the reported deployment of the mobile SS-25 ICBM at the Yurya complex where SS-20s are now also deployed.

#### Soviets Have 7 MX-Equivalent ICBMs

24. Soviet development of two more new type ICBMs, the SS-X-26, and SS-X-27, when only one new type ICBM is allowed by SALT II, and the Soviets are already deploying two other new type ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25.

#### Soviets Develop Powerful New Warheads

25. Additional and recent Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty yield limit of 150 kilotons, such as one on October 27, 1984, and one on December 16, 1984. Another Soviet underground test registering 7.2 on the Richter scale was reported in late December. While the January 23, 1984 Presidential Report listed Soviet violations of the TTBT as "likely," these more recent violations provide more evidence allowing a stronger judgment.

#### Soviets Renege on Pledge

26. Violating Brezhnev's SALT I pledge not to build mobile ICBMs, by building and deploying mobile SS-16 ICBMs during the time the SALT I Interim Agreement was in effect. Even President Carter conceded in 1977 that the Soviets had deployed mobile ICBMs.

### Soviets Have Capability for Nuclear Weapons in Space

27. Keeping 18 SS-9 Fractional Orbital Bombardment ICBMs operational at a test range, in circumvention of the SALT I Interim Agreement constraint on ICBM launchers and prohibition of operational launchers at test ranges. Even the Carter Administration conceded this SALT I violation in its analysis of the SALT II Treaty. This deployment also circumvents the 1967 U.S.-Soviet Treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space.

### Soviets Admit One Violation

28. Failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time under the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the 1974 agreed SALT dismantling procedures, and continuous falsification of official deactivation reports. The Soviets actually admitted in March, 1976 that they had failed to deactivate the required number of ICBMs, and that therefore they were in violation. They remained in violation through 1982.

### Soviet SALT Deceptions Violate Good Faith Requirement of Negotiations

29. Soviet withholding from their SALT II Data Exchange Reports of the fact that their AS-3 Air-to-Surface Missile deployable on over 100 Bear bombers has a range of 650 kilometers and therefore should be counted in the SALT II MIRV/ALCM ceiling. This violation was first revealed by the first edition of Soviet Military Power in 1981.

30. Soviet misrepresentation of Backfire range and refueling capabilities in SALT II negotiations. Even SALT-seller Strobe Talbott concedes this Soviet deception.

31. Soviet concealment of the full range of the SS-N-8 SLBM during SALT I negotiations.

32. Soviet falsification of their troop data in the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions negotiations.

33. Soviet withholding notification of their deployed SS-16 mobile ICBMs from their SALT II Data Exchange Reports.

34. Increasing Soviet use of large-scale and deliberate strategic camouflage, concealment, and deception, including telemetry encryption and jamming of U.S. telemetry collection capabilities. These activities violate both SALT I and SALT II, and have been increasing since SALT negotiations began in 1969. They are confirmed as deliberate by a Soviet military dictionary.

35. Creation of a new Soviet ABM test range in 1975 without the required prior notification, in violation of the ABM Treaty.

36. Soviet falsification of their deactivation of excess ABM test range launchers in 1974.

### Soviets Violate First Strategic Arms Agreement

37. Repeated Soviet violations of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty since 1965, continuing through the present. The 1984 venting level was as high as the 1965 venting itself. This violation was partially reported in the GAC Report, but more evidence has since become available.

38. Soviet flight-testing of their SS-24 and SS-25 at night, with the mobile launchers continuously concealed by camouflage, thereby violating the SALT II provision that the U.S. must be able to determine the relationship between a new missile and its launcher.

39. Soviet deployment of the SS-20, having ICBM range capability, as a circumvention of both the SALT I and SALT II ceilings on ICBM launchers. In addition, the Soviets falsified their Data Exchange by not including all their SS-20s.

40. Soviet deployment of "IIIX silos" with a deceptive configuration similar to a missile launch silo, confusing the U.S. as to the number of Soviet ICBM silos between 1970 and 1973.

41. Soviet achievement of "unilateral advantages" through their circumvention and violations of SALT I and II. These unilateral advantages violate the 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations, which is mentioned in the Preamble to the SALT II Treaty as a fundamental element of SALT II.

42. Soviet violation of the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, through their actions in the October 1973 Middle East War.

43. Use of submarine berthing tunnels to hide Soviet SLBM submarines, in violation of the provisions of both SALT I and SALT II banning deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception which impedes verification.

As the late Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev duplicitously prophesied, in regard to the first strategic arms limitation treaty, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty: "If some side violates the assumed commitments, the initiators of this violation will cover themselves with shame, they will be branded by all the people of the world."

Mr. President, as you yourself stated so eloquently before the United Nations General Assembly on June 17, 1982:

Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept. Otherwise we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war.

As former Arms Control Director Rostow testified to Congress in July, 1981:

No arms control agreement can contribute to the goal of a peaceful world unless we have confidence that the Soviet Union is abiding by its terms.

In 1935, prior to World War II, Sir Winston Churchill challenged the British Government over whether or not Hitler's Nazi Germany was complying with the arms control provisions of the Versailles Treaty. In the House of Commons, Churchill emphasized that: "The worst crime is not to tell the truth to the public..."